Putin, Ukraine, and History's Unheeded Warnings
By Darrell Lee
Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently offered an assessment of Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting he has grown "more out of control" and "desperate" in his unwavering determination to "extinguish" Ukraine. Her comments, made on Fox News on June 4, 2025, in the wake of Ukraine's increasingly audacious and technologically sophisticated attacks—such as the strikes on the Kerch Bridge and "Operation Spider's Web" targeting Russian strategic air assets—highlight a vital moment. Rice asserts that these Ukrainian successes, achieved with "just a little bit of help," demonstrate an ability to make Putin pay for his aggression and potentially force a strategic reassessment in Moscow, especially if confronted with unwavering international resolve. This perspective, emphasizing that an unstable, ideologically driven dictator unwilling to compromise will only be deterred or defeated by a concerted show of force and unwavering unity from those he attacks and their allies, has historical examples. From the failed appeasement of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s to the international coalitions that confronted Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, the historical record repeatedly underscores a grim lesson: concessions and disunity often embolden such leaders. At the same time, only credible, sustained strength and collective resolve can compel them to alter course or face ultimate defeat. Therefore, Rice's analysis of Putin is not merely a contemporary observation but a reflection of a recurring, dangerous pattern in the behavior of autocratic regimes.
Secretary Rice's characterization of Putin's current state, "more out of control than he used to be... almost more desperate", is particularly telling. She acknowledges his past as a controlled figure, albeit always an autocrat and an imperialist, but suggests a shift towards a more reckless pursuit of his objective to eradicate Ukrainian sovereignty. This desperation, she implies, might stem from a recognition of Russia's degrading energy infrastructure and the mounting costs of a protracted war. Yet, it is simultaneously, she said, "being overcome by that other Putin who still thinks he can extinguish Ukraine." This internal conflict within Putin's strategic calculus, a flicker of concern versus an overriding ideological obsession, is precisely where Rice sees an opportunity. Ukraine's innovative military actions, such as using relatively cheap drones to inflict significant damage on high-value Russian assets and the incredible intelligence coup of the Kerch Bridge attack (which she speculates will trigger a witch hunt within Russia), serve to heighten the costs and risks for Moscow. Her argument is clear: if President Donald Trump and Ukraine's allies make it very clear to him that he's not going to achieve his goals, then the practical Putin, recognizing his vulnerabilities, might be more inclined to stop this war. This assessment hinges on the belief that even a seemingly unyielding dictator can be influenced by a sufficiently strong and unified counterforce that consistently raises the price of aggression.
This dynamic finds its most chilling historical similarity in the rise of Adolf Hitler and the disastrous failure of appeasement in the 1930s. Hitler, driven by an unquenchable ambition for territory that he believed was needed for Germany's natural development and a fanatical racial ideology, initially presented himself as a leader seeking only to rectify the "injustices" of the Versailles Treaty. His early aggressive moves, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, and the demands on Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland, were met with hesitation, division, and ultimately concession from the Allied powers, Britain and France. The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, where Czechoslovakia was sacrificed in the name of "peace for our time," epitomized this policy. Appeasement was rooted in a desire to avoid another war, a misunderstanding of the limitless nature of Hitler's ambitions, and a failure to present a united, credible deterrent. Each concession, however, did not pacify Hitler but instead emboldened him, reinforcing his belief in the weakness and decadence of the Western democracies. He perceived their desire for peace as an exploitable vulnerability. It was only after the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, that Britain and France, finally recognizing the futility of appeasement, declared war. The subsequent global conflict demonstrated that Hitler's regime, increasingly out of control in its brutality and expansionism, would only be stopped by overwhelming, unified military force. The eventual Allied coalition, solidified by the entry of the Soviet Union (after being attacked in June 1941) and the United States (after Pearl Harbor in December 1941), possessed the necessary strength. Hitler's own increasing desperation in the final years, resorting to total war and scorched-earth tactics, mirrors the dangerous mindset Rice attributes to a cornered Putin. The lesson is obvious: failing to confront a dictator's escalating aggression with unified resolve early on allows the threat to metastasize, making the eventual confrontation far costlier.
A different, yet related, set of lessons emerges from the international responses to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saddam, an autocrat driven by regional ambitions and a disregard for international law, invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This act of aggression triggered a swift and unified international response. Under the auspices of the United Nations, a broad coalition led by the United States assembled a formidable military force. "Operation Desert Storm," launched on January 17, 1991, decisively expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait by February 28, 1991. This demonstrated that when the international community, particularly major powers, acts in concert and with overwhelming force, it can effectively reverse clear-cut acts of aggression by a regional dictator. Saddam, faced with this unified military power, was compelled to retreat. However, the aftermath revealed the complexities of dealing with a chastened but undefeated autocrat. For the next decade, Saddam played a cat-and-mouse game with UN weapons inspectors and maintained his repressive rule. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, launched by a US-led "coalition of the willing" but without the broad UN consensus of 1991, was justified by claims of WMD possession and links to terrorism. While it resulted in Saddam's overthrow (he was captured in December 2003) and execution, the lack of broader international unity and the controversial justifications led to a protracted and destabilizing insurgency. The two Gulf Wars offer contrasting lessons: unified international force can effectively counter overt aggression, but actions perceived as lacking broad legitimacy or clear, achievable objectives can lead to unintended and prolonged negative consequences, even if the immediate military goal of removing a dictator is achieved. Rice's emphasis on making it very clear to Putin that his goals are unachievable needs unambiguous, unified messaging backed by credible power.
The Balkan wars of the 1990s, particularly the actions of Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, provide another example of an aggressive nationalist leader exploiting international disunity until confronted by decisive force. Milošević masterfully stoked Serbian nationalism, contributing to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and instigating campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later Kosovo. For years, the international response was characterized by indecision, piecemeal sanctions, and UN peacekeeping efforts hampered by weak mandates and a lack of consensus among major powers. This allowed the conflicts to escalate, resulting in horrific atrocities, including the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, where over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were systematically murdered by Bosnian Serb forces. It was only after Srebrenica, and with growing public outrage that a more unified response emerged. NATO's "Operation Deliberate Force," a sustained air campaign against Bosnian Serb positions from August 30 to September 20, 1995, played an essential role in bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table and leading to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. Similarly, in Kosovo, after Milošević intensified his crackdown on ethnic Albanians, a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March 24 to June 10, 1999, forced him to withdraw his forces. Milošević was eventually overthrown by a popular uprising in October 2000 and subsequently indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Balkan experience demonstrated that prolonged international hesitation and disunity in the face of a dictator's aggression and atrocities only prolongs suffering. Decisive, unified military pressure, even if reluctantly applied, proved essential in compelling a change in behavior and ultimately bringing a measure of accountability.
Condoleezza Rice's analysis of Vladimir Putin's current mindset and the strategic imperatives for Ukraine and its allies aligns with these historical precedents. Putin's rhetoric, which denies Ukraine's legitimacy as a sovereign nation and seeks to re-establish a Russian sphere of imperial influence, is similar to the ideologically driven ambitions of past aggressors. His initial expectation of a swift victory, followed by a grinding, brutal war of attrition, suggests a leader miscalculating Ukraine's resolve and its international supporters' unity. Rice's observation that Putin seems more out of control and desperate could indicate an increasingly isolated leader, facing mounting internal pressures (perhaps exacerbated by events like the Kerch Bridge attack and the witch hunt she predicts) and resorting to more brutal tactics to achieve an increasingly elusive victory.
As Rice notes, the Ukrainian strategy employing innovative, asymmetric warfare with relatively cheap drones and achieving incredible intelligence coups demonstrates how a determined, well-supported nation can impose high costs on a seemingly more powerful aggressor. This follows historical instances where smaller nations or resistance movements, with sufficient external backing, have successfully bogged down or even repelled larger invading forces. As Rice implies, the key is a "little bit of help." For Ukraine, this translates into a sustained and substantial flow of advanced weaponry, intelligence support, economic aid, and robust sanctions against Russia from a unified international coalition.
The failed peace talks in Istanbul underscore Rice's point that negotiations with a dictator are unlikely to succeed unless that dictator is convinced he cannot achieve his objectives militarily. Hitler did not genuinely negotiate after his initial string of successes; Saddam only yielded on Kuwait when faced with imminent military defeat; Milošević only came to the table in Dayton after significant military pressure. If Putin still believes he can extinguish Ukraine, as Rice fears, then substantive peace talks remain a distant prospect. The imperative, therefore, is to create conditions on the battlefield and in the broader geopolitical arena that show him this notion is a mistake. This requires not only empowering Ukraine to defend itself and reclaim territory but also maintaining unwavering international unity in isolating Russia and imposing escalating costs for its aggression.
The current global landscape, with the United States under a Trump administration, adds another layer of complexity. Rice's direct call for President Trump to "make it very clear to him [Putin] that he's not going to get his maximalist claims" is a plea for unambiguous American leadership and resolve. Any perceived wavering, disunity among Western allies or signals that support for Ukraine might diminish could be interpreted by a desperate Putin as an opportunity to press his advantage or prolong the conflict in the hope of a more favorable outcome. History teaches that autocratic leaders are adept at exploiting divisions among their adversaries.
Condoleezza Rice's assessment of Vladimir Putin as an increasingly out-of-control and desperate leader whose imperial ambitions in Ukraine can only be checked by strength and unity is firmly rooted in the lessons of history. The experiences with Adolf Hitler's expansionism, Saddam Hussein's regional aggression, and Slobodan Milošević's ethnic wars all demonstrate a consistent pattern: dictators driven by extreme ideologies and a belief in their impunity rarely respond to appeals to reason or limited concessions. They interpret hesitation as weakness and are emboldened by disunity. They are only compelled to recalculate, negotiate seriously, or face defeat when confronted with credible, sustained, and unified military, economic, or diplomatic forces. Ukraine's innovative and courageous resistance, supported by international partners, is inflicting significant costs on Russia. However, to ensure that Putin cannot extinguish Ukraine and to create the conditions for a just and lasting peace, the message from the international community, led by the United States, must be one of unwavering resolve. The historical lessons are too painful to ignore: the path to containing and ultimately defeating such aggression lies not in a fractured response but in the clear demonstration of unified strength and the undeniable reality that the aggressor's aims will not be allowed to succeed.
Darrell Lee is the founder and editor of The Long Views, he has written two science fiction novels exploring themes of technological influence, science and religion, historical patterns, and the future of society. His essays draw on these long-standing interests and apply a similar analytical lens to politics, literature, artistic, societal, and historical events. He splits his time between rural east Texas and Florida’s west coast, where he spends his days performing variable star photometry, dabbling in astrophotography, thinking, napping, scuba diving, fishing, and writing, not necessarily in that order.